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ARENA FOOTBALL LEAGUE v. BISHOP
I’ve never taken it for granted, ever since Cooper [Manning]’s career was 
taken from him just like that. So I always had it in perspective, and I 
didn’t need a year off to remind me how lucky I was to play.1—Peyton 
Manning
 American football is an inherently violent game. Peyton Manning, one of the 
most prolific passers in National Football League history,2 understands that one 
consequence of the game is that a player’s career can end in an instant.3 Every year, 
millions of Americans tune in to watch the sport that has arguably supplanted 
baseball as America’s national pastime.4 And year after year, millions of Americans 
watch as another player is carted off the field after suffering a devastating injury.5 
Professional football players put their physical welfare in jeopardy in order to play the 
sport.6 The dreaded but always looming injury can kill players’ career aspirations in 
an instant.
 In Arena Football League v. Bishop, the Florida First District Court of Appeal 
considered whether an Arena Football League (AFL)7 player should receive workers’ 
compensation for an injury he sustained while participating in a team tryout.8 The 
1. Sally Jenkins, Peyton Manning on His Neck Surgeries—and How He Almost Didn’t Make It Back, Wash. 
Post (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/peyton-manning-on-his-neck-
surgeries-rehab--and-how-he-almost-didnt-make-it-back/2013/10/21/8e3b5ca6-3a55-11e3-b7ba-
503fb5822c3e_story.html?utm_term=.b87521f81c68.
2. See id.; see also Peyton Manning Stats, Pro Football Reference, https://www.pro-football-reference.
com/players/M/MannPe00.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
3. See Jenkins, supra note 1; Chris Wesseling, NFL Players with Most Memorable Careers Cut Short, NFL 
(July 18, 2013), http://www.nf l.com/news/story/0ap1000000218711/article/nf l-players-with-most-
memorable-careers-cut-.short (citing numerous examples of NFL players whose careers ended early 
because of injuries).
4. See NFL TV Viewership/Ratings Games 2018, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/749140/nfl-
viewership-figures-ratings (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (noting that viewership of the first game of the 
2018 season reached 23.3 million viewers); Max Jaeger, Football Still America’s Favorite Sport, but 
Popularity Is Falling, N.Y. Post (Jan. 4, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/01/04/football-still-americas-
favorite-sport-but-popularity-is-falling (“Football is still America’s favorite sport—and baseball is 
striking out . . . .”).
5. See John Branch, For N.F.L.’s Injury Carts, a History That Expands Beyond Tunnel to Field, N.Y. Times 
(Nov. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/sports/football/for-nf ls-injury-carts-a-history-
that-expands-beyond-tunnel-to-field.html.
6. See 2017 Injury Data, NFL Play Smart, Play Safe, https://www.playsmartplaysafe.com/newsroom/
reports/2017-injury-data (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (compiling NFL injury data between 2012 and 
2017); see also Zachary Binney, Just How Dangerous Is the NFL vs. Other Sports?, NFL Inj. Analytics 
(June 6, 2017), https://nf linjuryanalytics.com/2017/06/06/just-how-dangerous-is-the-nf l-vs-other-
sports (showing that the NFL has “by far the highest game injury rate” among the “Big 4 North 
American sports”).
7. The Arena Football League, founded in 1987, is an American professional football league. Its rules 
differ from those of traditional American football to facilitate more offense and scoring. See About the 
AFL, Arena Football League, https://www.arenafootball.com/articles/about-the-af l (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2019).
8. 220 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
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court, basing the outcome of the case on whether a valid employment contract existed 
between Bryon Bishop and the AFL, concluded that Bishop was not entitled to 
workers’ compensation after determining there was no valid contract.9
 This Case Comment contends that the court erred in withholding workers’ 
compensation benefits from Bishop. First, the court overlooked precedent allowing 
workers’ compensation benefits to extend to a non-employee due to a special 
relationship that arises at the time of the injury. Second, the court failed to consider 
whether to rely on the legal principle of promissory estoppel to award Bishop workers’ 
compensation benefits. Finally, the court’s decision allows AFL football teams to 
reap the benefits of trying out the best available players for their rosters while bearing 
none of the costs, leaving players without financial protection in the event that they 
are injured while trying out for a team.
 Bryon Bishop played ten games for the AFL’s Orlando Predators during the 2010 
season.10 After sustaining a back injury at the end of the season, the Predators traded 
Bishop to the Jacksonville Sharks.11 Bishop never played a game for the Sharks, 
however, and was cut mid-season.12 Bishop subsequently found employment outside 
the AFL, and in 2013 was about to start a new job as a case manager for a methadone 
treatment center when he was contacted by the Predators about an offensive lineman 
position for the upcoming AFL playoffs.13 With the hopes of resuming his football 
career, Bishop returned to the Predators and participated in a tryout with the team.14
 The tryout was held over a period of two days.15 At the end of the first day, 
Bishop signed a “Standard Player Contract.”16 The contract contained three different 
signature lines.17 The first line was titled “Player Signature” and was signed by 
Bishop.18 The second line, titled “Team Rep. Acknowledgement (Mandatory),” was 
9. Id. at 1246. Unlike the NFL, where players are employees of their respective teams, AFL players are 
considered employees of the League. Id. at 1245 n.2.
10. Bryon Bishop, Final Compensation Order at 6, Bishop v. Orlando Predators/Arena Football One, 
LLC, No. 13-18668-TWS (Fla. Off. J. Compensation Claims Dec. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Bishop, 2014 
OJCC Order]. Bishop had a brief tryout with the NFL’s Miami Dolphins during that season, but went 
unsigned and returned to the Predators. Id. 
11. Id. at 6–7.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id.
14. Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1244. 
15. Id.
16. Bishop, 2014 OJCC Order, supra note 10, at 10. The only contractual language included in the court’s 
opinion is as follows: “The Contract says that ‘[t]he League hires the Player as a skilled football player 
for employment beginning February 1, 2013 and ending August 31, 2013.’” Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1245.
17. Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1245.
18. Id.
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signed by the Predators’ coach.19 The third line, designated as “League Signature,” 
was to be signed by the AFL but never was.20
 On the second day of Bishop’s two-day tryout, he sustained an on-field injury to 
his neck and back.21 Bishop consequently sought workers’ compensation benefits 
from the AFL.22 However, the AFL claimed that Bishop was ineligible for workers’ 
compensation on the grounds that he was not an AFL employee, since the “League 
Signature” portion of the Standard Player Contract was never signed.23 On this basis 
the AFL contended that there was no contract between Bishop and the AFL.24
 Bishop brought a workers’ compensation claim against the AFL before a Florida 
Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC).25 The issue before the JCC was whether a 
valid employment contract existed between Bishop and the AFL so as to entitle 
Bishop to workers’ compensation.26 The JCC concluded that Bishop was under 
contract with the AFL at the time of his alleged injury and awarded him workers’ 
compensation benefits.27 The AFL subsequently appealed the determination to 
Florida’s First District Court of Appeal.28
 Bishop offered several arguments for affirming the JCC’s decision that a valid 
contract existed between the parties, each of which the court rejected. First, Bishop 
argued that no League signature was required to make the contract enforceable 
19. Id.
20. Id. Per its terms, the contract was to be filed with the League office within forty-eight hours after 
execution, Bryon Bishop, Final Compensation Order at 6–7, Bishop v. Orlando Predators/Arena 
Football One, LLC, No. 14-007837-TWS (Fla. Off. J. Compensation Claims Oct. 7, 2015), but it is 
unclear why the AFL never signed it. Joseph Kleinsmith, the AFL’s Senior Director of Football 
Operations, claimed that he was informed of Bishop’s injury two days after Bishop and the Predators’ 
coach signed the contract. Bishop, 2014 OJCC Order, supra note 10, at 12. 
21. Bishop, 2014 OJCC Order, supra note 10, at 11, 13. Bishop also injured his knee during the first day of 
the tryout. Id. at 9. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denied Bishop’s claims related to the first 
day’s injury after concluding that he did not have a valid written contract for that day. Id. at 20. Bishop 
did not challenge the ruling rejecting the first day’s injury. Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1244 n.1.
22. See Bishop, 220 So. 3d. at 1244. 
23. Id. at 1245.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 1244. The Florida Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims “is responsible for the mediation 
and adjudication of disputes over workers [sic] compensation benefits.” About Us, Off. J. Compensation 
Claims, https://www.jcc.state.f l.us/JCC/AboutUs.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). Orders issued by a 
JCC may be appealed to the First District Court of Appeal. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 9.180(b)(1) (West 2019).
26. Bishop, 220 So. 3d. at 1244. Florida’s workers’ compensation statute contains an exception that excludes 
professional athletes from coverage, § 440.02(17)(c)(3), but “the collective bargaining agreement . . . 
between the AFL and the AFL’s player’s union voluntarily provides workers’ compensation coverage to 
injured players who are part of the union [and who] have valid written contracts.” Bishop, 2014 OJCC 
Order, supra note 10, at 19–20. Since the case turned on whether there was a valid written contract 
between Bishop and the AFL, neither the JCC nor the First District Court of Appeal found the statute 
applicable. See id.; Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1244 n.1.
27. Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1245.
28. Id. 
313
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 63 | 2018/19
because the contract itself never expressly stated that such a signature was necessary.29 
In rejecting this argument, the court concluded that a contract cannot be enforceable 
against a nonsignatory, as a contract requires mutual assent to be valid.30 Instead, the 
court stated that where a contract provides a signature line for both parties, mutual 
assent cannot be shown without one party’s signature.31
 Second, Bishop pointed to language providing that “after execution” of the 
contract, the AFL Director of Football Operations has authority to “disapprove” the 
contract “for various reasons,” and that approval becomes automatic if there is no 
such “disapproval” within seven days of the contract’s execution.32 The court 
determined that the fact that Bishop’s contract was never “disapproved” was irrelevant 
to finding whether a contract was ever formed in the first place.33 The court noted 
that, there being no valid contract between the parties to begin with, the provisions 
of the contract were meaningless.34
 Finally, Bishop argued that the League assented to the contract by permitting 
him to try out for the team.35 While the court admitted “that parties may show 
assent through means other than signatures,” it determined that the only thing the 
AFL assented to was allowing Bishop to participate in a tryout, not to “hire the 
Player as a skilled football player for the duration of a football season.”36
 Consequently, the court held that the JCC incorrectly found that Bishop was 
under contract with the AFL at the time of his injury.37 The court concluded that 
there was neither a valid nor enforceable contract sufficient to create an employer-
employee relationship that would entitle Bishop to workers’ compensation benefits.38 
The court then reversed and remanded for entry of an order denying Bishop’s claims.39
 This Case Comment contends that although there was no contract, the court 
incorrectly denied Bishop workers’ compensation benefits. First, the court 
inappropriately overlooked precedent holding that workers’ compensation benefits 
should extend to a player in Bishop’s position because he was injured during a pre-
employment tryout phase that subjected him to a potential risk of injury, was under 
the control and direction of the AFL, and was acting for the benefit of the AFL. 
Second, the doctrine of promissory estoppel should have been invoked because 
Bishop reasonably and detrimentally relied on a promise from the AFL, which 
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989)).
31. Id. (“[O]nly one party’s signature cannot—without more—demonstrate mutual assent.”).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (“[I]f there was never mutual assent . . . [then] all the Contract’s provisions[] mean nothing.”).
35. See id. at 1246.
36. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. 
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induced him to take action. Lastly, this decision sets a troubling precedent for football 
players who are injured during an attempt to gain employment by unjustly imposing 
the costs of injury on them.
 First, the court should have awarded Bishop benefits because he was injured while 
participating in a tryout phase to play for the AFL. When an employer administers an 
application or tryout phase that is potentially hazardous to the applicant, under the 
control and direction of the employer, and is for the benefit of the employer, then the 
applicant is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits if injured, irrespective of 
whether a formal employment contract existed at the time of injury.40
 In 2012, Florida’s First District Court of Appeal considered for the first time 
whether an individual injured during a mandatory orientation session was an 
employee for purposes of determining eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits 
in Jenks v. Bynum Transportation, Inc.41 The court noted that Florida’s workers’ 
compensation statute defining the term “employee” used broad language, 
demonstrating that the legislature intended “to afford expansive coverage under the 
Florida workers’ compensation scheme, subject only to narrow exceptions.”42 Further, 
the court relied on case law from other jurisdictions which concluded that injuries 
sustained during a pre-employment period are compensable, and that a formal 
employment contract is not necessary to establish the requisite employment 
relationship for workers’ compensation benefits.43 The Jenks court considered, among 
other factors, that the claimant was required to attend orientation before starting 
employment, the employer paid for travel and lodging expenses during the orientation, 
and the employer exerted control over the orientation.44 Despite there being no 
40. See Jenks v. Bynum Transp., Inc., 104 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Laeng v. Workmen’s 
Comp. App. Bd., 494 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Smith v. Venezian Lamp Co., 168 N.Y.S.2d 764 (App. Div. 
1957).
41. 104 So. 3d at 1221.
42. Id. (citing Hazealeferiou v. Labor Ready, 947 So. 2d 599, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). Florida’s 
workers’ compensation law defines “employee” as:
[A]ny person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any 
work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract 
for hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or 
unlawfully employed, and includes, but is not limited to, aliens and minors.
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.02(15)(a) (West 2019). Although professional athletes are explicitly exempted 
from the statute, the Bishop court accepted the JCC’s determination that the statute did not apply. See 
Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1244 n.1.
43. Jenks, 104 So. 3d at 1221; see Hubble v. Dyer Nursing Home, 188 S.W.3d 525, 533 (Tenn. 2006) 
(holding that an employee was entitled to workers’ compensation despite not completing the orientation 
period); Dodson v. Workers’ Comp. Div., 558 S.E.2d 635, 636 (W. Va. 2001) (holding that an employee 
who was injured while completing a pre-employment physical test was entitled to workers’ compensation 
because the test was for the employer’s benefit and under its direction, and it exposed the employee to 
the risk of immediate and significant harm). 
44. Jenks, 104 So. 3d at 1222.
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formal employment contract, the court concluded that the claimant was an employee 
for purposes of awarding workers’ compensation benefits.45 
 The holding in Jenks is consistent with case law from other jurisdictions dating 
back to 1957. In Smith v. Venezian Lamp Co., a New York claimant seeking a position 
as a lamp polisher was injured during a trial period.46 The court held that a claimant 
injured while trying out for a job was entitled to workers’ compensation, regardless of 
whether wages or hours were discussed or whether the claimant was paid for any 
work.47 The court explained that “where a tryout involves an operation that would be 
ordinarily viewed as hazardous under the Workmen’s Compensation Law[,] a special 
employment exists.”48 In holding that the claimant was entitled to workers’ 
compensation benefits, the court asserted that denying the claimant benefits would 
be “contrary to the more modern concept of employment . . . .”49
 Similarly, in Laeng v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board in 1972, a California 
applicant for a city’s refuse collection department was injured during an “obstacle 
course” that simulated what the actual employment would entail.50 In finding the 
applicant eligible for workers’ compensation, the court stated that the “special risk” 
undertaken by the applicant was for the benefit of, and performed under, the city’s 
direction and control.51 Thus, the city’s tryout program, which prescribed “arduous 
and potentially hazardous tasks[,] . . . structured a relationship between applicant 
and employer, which, although not necessarily resultant in permanent employment, 
was inchoate and viable.”52
 Instead of overlooking precedent from its own jurisdiction and others, the Bishop 
court should have taken into account the same considerations as Jenks to find that an 
employment relationship existed, entitling Bishop to workers’ compensation. In that 
way, the court would have broadened its analysis beyond the contract and, consistent 
with the Florida legislature’s intent, examined other factors to determine whether an 
employment relationship was formed notwithstanding the AFL’s missing signature.53 
45. Id. 
46. 168 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765–66 (App. Div. 1957).
47. Id. at 766.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 494 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1972).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 9.
53. While the Bishop court acknowledged that a claimant does not need a formal contract to be entitled to 
workers’ compensation benefits, the parties apparently stipulated before trial that the outcome of 
Bishop’s claim depended on its existence. See Arena Football League v. Bishop, 220 So. 3d 1243, 1244 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“[T]he parties agree that Bishop’s claim depends on this [c]ontract.”). 
However, a court is not bound to accept as controlling a stipulation to questions of law. Swift & Co. v. 
Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289–90 (1917) (“If the stipulation is to be treated as an agreement 
concerning the legal effect of admitted facts, it is obviously inoperative; since the court cannot be 
controlled by agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of law.”).
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Because it focused its analysis solely on the four corners of the document, the court 
neglected to incorporate any relevant facts from the JCC’s proceeding which might 
have supported Bishop’s claim.54
 Had the court followed the example set by Jenks, it would have found persuasive 
authority for the proposition that workers’ compensation benefits extend to a person 
who is injured during a tryout phase prior to attaining formal employment, regardless 
of whether they were paid for the tryout. Like the plaintiffs in Smith and Laeng, 
Bishop was injured during a tryout phase prior to becoming an official AFL 
employee.55 A football tryout is certainly hazardous to the applicant since football is 
a physical sport that always involves the risk of injury.56 The tryout was also under 
the direction and control of the AFL—tryouts are conducted by AFL teams for the 
AFL’s benefit as a means of identifying the best available players.57 Therefore, as in 
Smith, a special employment relationship was created when Bishop participated in a 
hazardous tryout with the AFL. And, as in Laeng, Bishop was entitled to workers’ 
compensation for the injury he sustained while undertaking a “special risk” under the 
direction and control of the AFL.
 Second, even in the absence of an employee-employer relationship, the court 
should have found that Bishop was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is equitable 
in nature: It operates to enforce a promise when the requirements for forming a valid 
contract are not met.58 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “a promise 
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the 
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”59 The 
doctrine of promissory estoppel is a fundamental doctrine of contract law, one that 
the Florida District Court of Appeal has previously invoked to enforce agreements.60 
Legal scholars have widely acknowledged that the drafters of the Restatement made 
“several important changes . . . with the intent of making promissory estoppel more 
available, the role of reliance more prominent, and the remedies awarded to successful 
54. For example, in the Bishop 2014 Order, the JCC reviewed an exchange of text messages between Bishop 
and the Predators’ coach that might have provided evidence of mutual assent to form an employment 
contract. See Bishop, 2014 Order, supra note 10, at 8.
55. Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1244.
56. Branch, supra note 5. 
57. Bishop, 220 So. 3d at 1244; see also John Domen, Hundreds Try Out for DC’s New Arena Football League 
Team, WTOP (Oct. 8, 2016), https://wtop.com/local-sports/2016/10/hundreds-tryout-dcs-new-arena-
league-team/slide/1 (discussing how hundreds of applicants tried out for a new AFL team that offered 
only twenty-eight roster spots).
58. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
59. Id. § 90(1). 
60. See, e.g., Criterion Leasing Grp. v. Gulf Coast Plastering & Drywall, 582 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding that, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a subcontractor was estopped from 
denying employees insurance coverage).
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litigants more flexible.”61 The result was to make promissory estoppel a more prevalent 
doctrine and “no longer a fallback theory of recovery.”62
 Here, the court erred by failing to apply a fundamental doctrine of contract law 
that would have prevented an injustice to Bishop. Had the court taken this doctrine 
into account, it would have estopped the AFL from unjustly avoiding its obligation 
to compensate Bishop for his injury. The AFL should have expected that Bishop 
would have reasonably relied on the Standard Player Contract to justify risking injury 
to participate in the tryout. Bishop actually and detrimentally relied on the contract 
because he did, in fact, participate in the tryout and was injured as a result. Foisting 
the expenses on Bishop for an injury he sustained for the AFL’s benefit is the very 
kind of injustice the doctrine of promissory estoppel was designed to prevent.63 
Therefore, the court should have invoked promissory estoppel to enforce the 
agreement and entitle Bishop to workers’ compensation benefits.
 Finally, the Bishop court’s decision is problematic because it leaves players with 
no viable options for compensation if they are injured while trying out for a 
professional team. This precedent incentivizes sports organizations to avoid signing 
player contracts during the standard tryout phase, exposing the player to the cost of 
injury despite acting pursuant to team or League directives. The player essentially 
assumes all of the risk by trying to gain employment while the team subjects players 
to rigorous and hazardous physical activities freely and without consequence. This 
creates an unnecessary and unfair hurdle for the players, most of whom rely on 
football as a source of income.64 A serious injury during a team tryout will significantly 
diminish a player’s employment prospects. Especially in the AFL, where players 
make nowhere near the exorbitant salaries of their NFL counterparts,65 players risk a 
tremendous amount just by attempting to gain employment.
 The Bishop court erred when it concluded that Bishop was not entitled to workers’ 
compensation benefits for the injury he sustained while participating in a tryout with 
an AFL team. The court overlooked relevant precedent holding that a job applicant 
can still be covered under workers’ compensation laws when participating in a 
61. Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 669, 671 (2010).
62. Id. at 722 (quoting Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law 
and the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 903, 904 (1985)).
63. Cf. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. McBride, 517 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1987) (declaring that promissory estoppel 
can serve as a justification for creating insurance coverage where refusing to do so “would sanction fraud 
or other injustice”).
64. See Brett Williams, Meet the Pro Football Players Who Don’t Make Millions, Splinter News (Feb. 5, 
2016), https://splinternews.com/meet-the-pro-football-players-who-don-t-make-millions-1793854513 
(discussing the financial struggles and uncertainty that some professional football players face—even in 
the NFL).
65. See Zac Boyer, In Arena League, Dreams of Following Jay Gruden’s Path, Wash. Times (July 22, 2014), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/22/arena-football-league-dreams-following-jay-
grudens (noting that AFL players make only $830 per game, and that many players work second jobs to 
supplement their incomes); Cf. NFL 2018 Player Salaries, Pro Football Reference, https://www.
pro-football-reference.com/players/salary.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
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potentially hazardous tryout phase. Additionally, the court failed to analyze the 
fundamental doctrine of promissory estoppel to prevent an injustice to Bishop. 
Moreover, the Bishop court’s holding creates unnecessary obstacles for professional 
football players who seek employment by shifting the risk of injury entirely on them. 
For players whose career prospects can be destroyed in an instant, the Bishop decision 
does little to ameliorate the risk of losing it all.
